Since its inception in 2005 the brief of this column has been to provide readers with backstories to current (Formula 1) affairs, relying on in-depth analysis, respected sources, informed opinion, and, yes, downright speculation to do so. This week's column relies on all those listed components, with no apologies made for admitting that the last-named element features strongly - albeit founded upon information imparted by folk in the know.
However, lest it's said that sources are partisan, their information was crosschecked with players on the opposite bank of the political divide. When it waddles like a duck and quacks like a duck there is every reason to believe the subject is indeed a member of the Anatidae family, and hence the topic of this week's column: That the concept of satellite (or A and B) teams is closer to reality than even many team bosses realise.
Having tried and failed (so far) to introduce the eight-team/three-car structure first revealed by this column two years ago, and after facing immense pressure over its straightforward customer car concept, it seems commercial rights holder Formula One Management has elected to focus on 10 (or 12 at a push) teams, with major teams supplying expensive components or services to associate or satellite operations.
Super Aguri was effectively a Honda customer team - and sometimes beat its parent © XPB |
Of the three options (third cars, full customers cars, and satellites) the last-named is by far the easiest to implement by virtue that it would extract the least number of casualties while legitimising a fair number of loopholes that exist in the regulations as they stand. In addition, the spreading (or sharing) of expensive resources delivers economies of scale, the ultimate prize in an industry centred on the production of prototypes.
True, a number of regulations would need to be rewritten - make that adapted - but when a concept works in favour of various teams plus the commercial rights holder and governing body, it is likely to be realised given their two-thirds majority in the 18-vote Strategy Group. Thus this is not a question of bowing to those who favour full customer (or third) cars for whatever self-centred reasons.
The problem with the three-car concept is that it would require grids to drop to eight teams before it could be applied equitably - despite that term existing only notionally in F1 - while full customer cars would basically put all bar five or six teams out of business.
Yes, customer operations would still be required to operate such cars, but they would be no more than glorified GP2 teams, while existing operations would need to be either chronically emasculated or even shuttered completely. Then there's the question of how to score or allocate points to such teams, or even commercial benefits?
Nothing would attract the attention of the European Commission quicker than such anomalies, and thus the concept has been quietly shunted backburner side, but not (yet) shelved completely...
With the first two options effectively blocked, FOM - squeezed from above by venture fund parent CVC Capital Partners and below by four major teams on preferential terms - remains desperate to reduce payments to teams while maximising revenues from the sport's three major streams (race hosting, broadcast contracts and miscellaneous [hospitality, merchandising, circuit advertising]) in order to appease its voracious owner.
Hence the single car (or core car) concept, whereby clusters of teams would co-operate in the design and development of a basic design, with members of the co-operation thereafter adapting the design to their specific needs, be it disparate aero concepts or even different power units.
Incomer Haas openly alluded to such an arrangement with Ferrari for its 2016 debut, while Red Bull Racing and sister team Scuderia Toro Rosso already share common back-end installations. How much longer before these they diverge further? In recent years McLaren provided various goods and services to Marussia/Manor, with a spokesman for the former admitting that such arrangements will continue into the future.
Ferrari Raffaelle Marciello will learn with a Sauber F1 role this year © LAT |
Force India and Sauber purchase complete back ends from Mercedes and Ferrari respectively, with both enjoying test driver links to their vendors, and thus the only odd-team-out - to coin a phrase - is Williams, and even here its links to Mercedes are solid thanks to (admittedly reducing) shareholdings in the publicly-listed team by Mercedes motorsport director Toto Wolff.
In fact, so close are some co-operations, particularly with regard to shared windtunnels and CFD facilities, that fears exist in certain quarters that no clearly demarcated separations of work can be tracked - i.e. does, say, Team X, as aero services supplier to Team Z, use Z's allocated hours to develop noses solely for its customer, or does such work trickle down to Team A's car in contravention of windtunnel restrictions?
The beauty of the core car concept is that it ticks (almost) all customer car boxes while retaining the 10- or 12-team status quo, yet without the expense of running third cars.
True, it is not a full customer car concept per se, and thus kickback can be expected, but as long as the grid labours under CVC's utter cynicism, this remains the best compromise in a sport already brought to its knees by non-compromise.
The reasoning behind the core cars is simple: The infrastructure is in place for a quick switchover, as the majority of independent teams already sub-contract the majority of their components. If independents in any event out-source or sub-contract, then encourage them do so within F1 rather than traipse to suppliers, and where components can be standardised, then so much the better for quality, price and, whisper it, safety.
Sadly in this dog-eat-dog world, where, in the words of one team executive, "you eat what you kill", F1's supplier chain will be decimated, but for their combined dilemmas the disadvantaged vendors should turn on CVC and FOM, not the teams - most of whom are struggling to survive, certainly at the bottom end.
The core car concept is believed to be one of the alternatives examined (but NOT proposed: the concept was born within the sport itself) by McKinsey and Partners, which counts Ferrari president Sergio Marchionne amongst its disciples, in order to cut costs while improving 'the show'.
The respected international management consultancy was recently commissioned to undertake an in-depth study of the sport for the strategy group. Yet, in keeping with F1's strangely secretive covenants, this absolutely crucial full report was not circulated to the full grid, and so not all team principals have had sight of its contents...
So how does the single or core - the exact nomenclature has yet to be decided upon - car concept work? For automotive parallels look no further than the original VW Sharan and Ford Galaxy, which relied upon fundamentally common body monocoques, with each manufacturer specifying own badges, trim levels and mechanicals. In silhouette format, the cars look identical; differing, though, vastly in detail/performance (and price).
An even closer collaboration would be straightforward for Toro Rosso and Red Bull © LAT |
Within the VW Group common platforms and mechanicals are now shared by up to five brands - depending upon market segment - providing a future parallel with the Red Bull Formula 1 family, whose two teams already rely upon common Renault mechanicals, with cross-production of some components already under way. How much longer before Toro Rosso nominates Red Bull Racing's windtunnel for its 'own' development?
Even closer parallels can be drawn with the Toyota Aygo/Peugeot 106/Citroen C1 product, all three cars being produced in the same Czech factory and equipped with the same mechanicals, with only badging and trim differing. Economies of scale are the major advantage, permitting three brands to spread development costs of city cars - which deliver notoriously low profit levels - over greater production runs.
Now consider the plights of Force India, Lotus and Sauber: all three are battling on meagre budgets, yet have own facilities which they are obviously reluctant to close or downsize, as would be the case should customer cars be introduced. Sauber has access to (arguably) the sport's best windtunnel, while the other two have their own bases - yet the three arguably have lower combined budgets than does Ferrari.
Imagine a car honed by Sauber, with major components built by Lotus and sub-assembly and electronics/hydraulic development undertaken by Force India. The base chassis would be designed to accommodate all F1 power units - already regulations prescribe common mountings - with teams adapting cooling and suspension mountings to their own requirements. Thus bodywork would still differ in detail.
Had Lotus retained Renault power and this concept been introduced this year, all three teams above would have fitted different power units - with different performance levels - while allowing the trio to maintain unique grid identifies (impossible with customer cars), thus proving the overall flexibility of the basic concept.
Here comes the speculation alluded to in the opening paragraph: It is not impossible to foresee Ferrari and Haas co-operating fully on 2016 design, with McLaren and Manor GP entering into a similar partnership. Indeed, one hears (unconfirmed rumours) that the latter's Ferrari engine deal has a shelf life of less than a season, and that Honda units could well be shoe-horned into the Manors before the season is out. Haas SF16 or Manor MP4-30, anyone?
Haas has made clear he wants to use F1's collaborative openings as much as possible © XPB |
The RBR/STR relationship is clear, leaving just Mercedes to link up with a satellite. Although Force India is the obvious candidate - it last week ran a 2014 car for Mercedes DTM star/Wolff protege Pascal Wehrlein at Barcelona - it seems relations between the two teams have cooled of late. Williams could therefore provide the solution, albeit on looser terms given the Grove-based team's superb infrastructure.
That said, one of the advantages is that should Mercedes and Williams elect to opt out of the core car concept, they would be free do so without a discernible sporting or technical disadvantage, although there would obviously be commercial penalties. This further underscores the flexibility of core cars.
The burning question is, of course, how soon? According to various sources the concept was tabled at the last Formula 1 Commission meeting, but hardly got beyond first base due to a plethora of agenda items.
There is, though, no denying that it requires urgent attention, for the three independents are on their uppers, yet need to lay down the basics for their 2016 challengers, as do all others - so the sooner the better.
However, to introduce core cars for 2016 would require swingeing overhauls of F1's 'listed parts' - those components to which teams are required to hold the intellectual property, including monocoques, crash structures, fuel cells and pedal and steering assemblies - with the window for doing so by 70 per cent majority (now) closing on March 1. However, thereafter unanimity would do the trick.
But, said one source, "The core car concept is doable by 2016, but it would be very tight, and the later we leave it, the tighter it gets". Clearly it is down to will: Does F1 have the will to go down this route?
The FIA and FOM are believed to favour core cars for the concept ticks their own boxes such as grid sizes (the latter) and cost cutting (both). Yes, certain teams focused on selling full customer cars may feel anti on the basis that it is a compromise too many, but they, too, would reap the benefits of economies of scale, yet remain free to opt out if they so wish.
In the final analysis the core car concept seemingly offers by far the most equitable solution to F1's ongoing issues - strong words from this column given its commitment to maintaining the sport's status quo - for it provides a wide variety of options without the devastating effect of further teams going to the wall, all while providing that rare F1 commodity: flexibility.
Since its inception in 2005 the brief of this column has been to provide readers with backstories to current (Formula 1) affairs, relying on in-depth analysis, respected sources, informed opinion, and, yes, downright speculation to do so. This week's column relies on all those listed components, with no apologies made for admitting that the last-named element features strongly - albeit founded upon information imparted by folk in the know.
However, lest it's said that sources are partisan, their information was crosschecked with players on the opposite bank of the political divide. When it waddles like a duck and quacks like a duck there is every reason to believe the subject is indeed a member of the Anatidae family, and hence the topic of this week's column: That the concept of satellite (or A and B) teams is closer to reality than even many team bosses realise.
Having tried and failed (so far) to introduce the eight-team/three-car structure first revealed by this column two years ago, and after facing immense pressure over its straightforward customer car concept, it seems commercial rights holder Formula One Management has elected to focus on 10 (or 12 at a push) teams, with major teams supplying expensive components or services to associate or satellite operations.
Super Aguri was effectively a Honda customer team - and sometimes beat its parent © XPB |
Of the three options (third cars, full customers cars, and satellites) the last-named is by far the easiest to implement by virtue that it would extract the least number of casualties while legitimising a fair number of loopholes that exist in the regulations as they stand. In addition, the spreading (or sharing) of expensive resources delivers economies of scale, the ultimate prize in an industry centred on the production of prototypes.
True, a number of regulations would need to be rewritten - make that adapted - but when a concept works in favour of various teams plus the commercial rights holder and governing body, it is likely to be realised given their two-thirds majority in the 18-vote Strategy Group. Thus this is not a question of bowing to those who favour full customer (or third) cars for whatever self-centred reasons.
The problem with the three-car concept is that it would require grids to drop to eight teams before it could be applied equitably - despite that term existing only notionally in F1 - while full customer cars would basically put all bar five or six teams out of business.
Yes, customer operations would still be required to operate such cars, but they would be no more than glorified GP2 teams, while existing operations would need to be either chronically emasculated or even shuttered completely. Then there's the question of how to score or allocate points to such teams, or even commercial benefits?
Nothing would attract the attention of the European Commission quicker than such anomalies, and thus the concept has been quietly shunted backburner side, but not (yet) shelved completely...
With the first two options effectively blocked, FOM - squeezed from above by venture fund parent CVC Capital Partners and below by four major teams on preferential terms - remains desperate to reduce payments to teams while maximising revenues from the sport's three major streams (race hosting, broadcast contracts and miscellaneous [hospitality, merchandising, circuit advertising]) in order to appease its voracious owner.
Hence the single car (or core car) concept, whereby clusters of teams would co-operate in the design and development of a basic design, with members of the co-operation thereafter adapting the design to their specific needs, be it disparate aero concepts or even different power units.
Incomer Haas openly alluded to such an arrangement with Ferrari for its 2016 debut, while Red Bull Racing and sister team Scuderia Toro Rosso already share common back-end installations. How much longer before these they diverge further? In recent years McLaren provided various goods and services to Marussia/Manor, with a spokesman for the former admitting that such arrangements will continue into the future.
Ferrari Raffaelle Marciello will learn with a Sauber F1 role this year © LAT |
Force India and Sauber purchase complete back ends from Mercedes and Ferrari respectively, with both enjoying test driver links to their vendors, and thus the only odd-team-out - to coin a phrase - is Williams, and even here its links to Mercedes are solid thanks to (admittedly reducing) shareholdings in the publicly-listed team by Mercedes motorsport director Toto Wolff.
In fact, so close are some co-operations, particularly with regard to shared windtunnels and CFD facilities, that fears exist in certain quarters that no clearly demarcated separations of work can be tracked - i.e. does, say, Team X, as aero services supplier to Team Z, use Z's allocated hours to develop noses solely for its customer, or does such work trickle down to Team A's car in contravention of windtunnel restrictions?
The beauty of the core car concept is that it ticks (almost) all customer car boxes while retaining the 10- or 12-team status quo, yet without the expense of running third cars.
True, it is not a full customer car concept per se, and thus kickback can be expected, but as long as the grid labours under CVC's utter cynicism, this remains the best compromise in a sport already brought to its knees by non-compromise.
The reasoning behind the core cars is simple: The infrastructure is in place for a quick switchover, as the majority of independent teams already sub-contract the majority of their components. If independents in any event out-source or sub-contract, then encourage them do so within F1 rather than traipse to suppliers, and where components can be standardised, then so much the better for quality, price and, whisper it, safety.
Sadly in this dog-eat-dog world, where, in the words of one team executive, "you eat what you kill", F1's supplier chain will be decimated, but for their combined dilemmas the disadvantaged vendors should turn on CVC and FOM, not the teams - most of whom are struggling to survive, certainly at the bottom end.
The core car concept is believed to be one of the alternatives examined (but NOT proposed: the concept was born within the sport itself) by McKinsey and Partners, which counts Ferrari president Sergio Marchionne amongst its disciples, in order to cut costs while improving 'the show'.
The respected international management consultancy was recently commissioned to undertake an in-depth study of the sport for the strategy group. Yet, in keeping with F1's strangely secretive covenants, this absolutely crucial full report was not circulated to the full grid, and so not all team principals have had sight of its contents...
So how does the single or core - the exact nomenclature has yet to be decided upon - car concept work? For automotive parallels look no further than the original VW Sharan and Ford Galaxy, which relied upon fundamentally common body monocoques, with each manufacturer specifying own badges, trim levels and mechanicals. In silhouette format, the cars look identical; differing, though, vastly in detail/performance (and price).
An even closer collaboration would be straightforward for Toro Rosso and Red Bull © LAT |
Within the VW Group common platforms and mechanicals are now shared by up to five brands - depending upon market segment - providing a future parallel with the Red Bull Formula 1 family, whose two teams already rely upon common Renault mechanicals, with cross-production of some components already under way. How much longer before Toro Rosso nominates Red Bull Racing's windtunnel for its 'own' development?
Even closer parallels can be drawn with the Toyota Aygo/Peugeot 106/Citroen C1 product, all three cars being produced in the same Czech factory and equipped with the same mechanicals, with only badging and trim differing. Economies of scale are the major advantage, permitting three brands to spread development costs of city cars - which deliver notoriously low profit levels - over greater production runs.
Now consider the plights of Force India, Lotus and Sauber: all three are battling on meagre budgets, yet have own facilities which they are obviously reluctant to close or downsize, as would be the case should customer cars be introduced. Sauber has access to (arguably) the sport's best windtunnel, while the other two have their own bases - yet the three arguably have lower combined budgets than does Ferrari.
Imagine a car honed by Sauber, with major components built by Lotus and sub-assembly and electronics/hydraulic development undertaken by Force India. The base chassis would be designed to accommodate all F1 power units - already regulations prescribe common mountings - with teams adapting cooling and suspension mountings to their own requirements. Thus bodywork would still differ in detail.
Had Lotus retained Renault power and this concept been introduced this year, all three teams above would have fitted different power units - with different performance levels - while allowing the trio to maintain unique grid identifies (impossible with customer cars), thus proving the overall flexibility of the basic concept.
Here comes the speculation alluded to in the opening paragraph: It is not impossible to foresee Ferrari and Haas co-operating fully on 2016 design, with McLaren and Manor GP entering into a similar partnership. Indeed, one hears (unconfirmed rumours) that the latter's Ferrari engine deal has a shelf life of less than a season, and that Honda units could well be shoe-horned into the Manors before the season is out. Haas SF16 or Manor MP4-30, anyone?
Haas has made clear he wants to use F1's collaborative openings as much as possible © XPB |
The RBR/STR relationship is clear, leaving just Mercedes to link up with a satellite. Although Force India is the obvious candidate - it last week ran a 2014 car for Mercedes DTM star/Wolff protege Pascal Wehrlein at Barcelona - it seems relations between the two teams have cooled of late. Williams could therefore provide the solution, albeit on looser terms given the Grove-based team's superb infrastructure.
That said, one of the advantages is that should Mercedes and Williams elect to opt out of the core car concept, they would be free do so without a discernible sporting or technical disadvantage, although there would obviously be commercial penalties. This further underscores the flexibility of core cars.
The burning question is, of course, how soon? According to various sources the concept was tabled at the last Formula 1 Commission meeting, but hardly got beyond first base due to a plethora of agenda items.
There is, though, no denying that it requires urgent attention, for the three independents are on their uppers, yet need to lay down the basics for their 2016 challengers, as do all others - so the sooner the better.
However, to introduce core cars for 2016 would require swingeing overhauls of F1's 'listed parts' - those components to which teams are required to hold the intellectual property, including monocoques, crash structures, fuel cells and pedal and steering assemblies - with the window for doing so by 70 per cent majority (now) closing on March 1. However, thereafter unanimity would do the trick.
But, said one source, "The core car concept is doable by 2016, but it would be very tight, and the later we leave it, the tighter it gets". Clearly it is down to will: Does F1 have the will to go down this route?
The FIA and FOM are believed to favour core cars for the concept ticks their own boxes such as grid sizes (the latter) and cost cutting (both). Yes, certain teams focused on selling full customer cars may feel anti on the basis that it is a compromise too many, but they, too, would reap the benefits of economies of scale, yet remain free to opt out if they so wish.
In the final analysis the core car concept seemingly offers by far the most equitable solution to F1's ongoing issues - strong words from this column given its commitment to maintaining the sport's status quo - for it provides a wide variety of options without the devastating effect of further teams going to the wall, all while providing that rare F1 commodity: flexibility.