Why Liverpool’s compact defence is Arne Slot’s first big win
By Mark Carey
When studying Arne Slot’s tactical tweaks, the discussion has centred on Liverpool’s patient build-up and careful progression through the attacking thirds.
However, it is worth noting how impressive their out-of-possession performances have been — and it has not gone unnoticed in the squad.
“We look a bit more secure defensively and had a lot more control,” Andrew Robertson told Sky Sports after their 3-0 victory over Manchester United.
“They always say clean sheets will win you things, and that’s always been the case when Manchester Cityhave won the league and when we did. Three games without a goal conceded is really good and we want to keep that going.”
Yes, we are still in the early stages and tougher challenges await. Based on Opta’s Power Rankings (a global league table of domestic sides that uses advanced analytics to assign an ‘ability score’ from 0-100), Liverpool’s opening 10 games are the sixth-easiest among the 20 teams in the Premier League.
Nevertheless, there have been promising signs that Liverpool are notably more solid when defending transitional moments. Fending off counter-attacks was often their undoing last season as they ran out of steam.
“When you look back at last season’s stats, even when we were still in the title race, we were conceding more chances than Arsenaland Man City. When you keep doing that, you will get punished. Alisson made far too many saves,” Robertson said.
“We conceded too many shots and we’ve worked hard to limit that. We’re not perfect, we’re not anywhere near where the manager wants us to be — but we’re getting there and we can see improvements day to day.”
Beyond the obvious statistics of shots and goals conceded, Jurgen Klopp’s men conceded 3.1 ‘direct attacks’ — a proxy of counter-attacking — per 90 minutes last season, the sixth-highest in the Premier League. For context, title rivals Manchester City and Arsenal were among the bottom three for that metric.
Looking at examples from last season, Liverpool’s all-action style meant there were too many occasions where the opposition got beyond the midfield line with numbers descending on a retreating defence.
We can further interrogate the numbers from last season using data from Footovision — an analytics company that has created new contextual metrics by combining event and tracking data from video broadcast footage.
As The Athletic has outlined, Liverpool were typically front-footed after losing the ball last year with their frequent counter-pressing actions. Quick regains high up the field were synonymous with former manager Klopp, but when his team were played through, they were often too open defensively.
Among all the defensive phases of the game when Liverpool were out of possession, 34 per cent of that time was spent in transition — ie, the moments when one team loses the ball and the other team gains possession.
Only Tottenham Hotspurhad a higher share of time in this phase, which speaks to the high-octane style that Klopp regained during his final season at the club.
Pouncing quickly in these transitional moments can be lucrative from an attacking sense. Tactically, they are designed to take advantage of the opponent’s unstructured shape as they look to shift into their own possession phase.
Klopp has referred to these moments as “organised chaos” from his team. It might look frantic, but it requires close coordination from all outfielders to ensure that the spaces are closed and the opposition cannot wriggle free.
For Liverpool, the numbers suggest they did not squeeze the pitch as much as they would have liked last season. Footovision’s metrics record the vertical compactness (in metres) during the moments of transition to a defensive phase. This is calculated by looking at the average vertical distance between any player and the centre-point of the team at the moment of the turnover.
Liverpool’s compactness distance of 9.9 metres was the third-highest in these moments, underpinning the gaps in their team shape from back to front.
It might not seem like a large spread of distances across the league but, at the elite level, these small distances matter — they can be the difference between making a tackle or conceding an opposition counter-attack.
Mapping out Liverpool’s defensive block compared with Manchester City and Arsenal last season, Klopp’s side had the highest width (31 metres) and depth (28 metres) in their team shape during moments of transition.
In short, there was more space for the opposition to exploit in these crucial moments — a key reason Liverpool conceded more counter-attacks than most in the division.
It is far too early to rely on this season’s numbers, but there looks to be a qualitative difference in Liverpool’s defensive output under Slot.
First, their switch to a 4-2-4 out of possession has provided a solid foundation across their general defensive phase, with wingers blocking passes out to the opposition full-backs and a striker (Diogo Jota) and attacking midfielder (Dominik Szoboszlai) preventing the ball from being progressed through central spaces.
In transitional moments, Slot has harnessed Liverpool’s energetic, front-footed approach when they do not have the ball — shown by each of their three goals coming from direct attacks following high turnovers against Manchester United.
However, Robertson’s reference to greater defensive control is partly linked to their diligence on the ball when progressing through the thirds, gradually pinning the opposition back with a robust structure that prevents the opposition from getting out if they win it back.
As you can see from their home game against Brentford, this approach is beneficial for two reasons. First, it helps to sustain attacks — as Mohamed Salahtakes possession away from Kristoffer Ajer— but with so many bodies around the ball in a compact shape, it also means there are fewer transitional moments to concede.
It is a good example of how Slot has structured Liverpool’s ‘rest defence’ — a term that looks at a team’s defensive positioning and shape when they are attacking.
Below, you can see Liverpool in a compact 3-5-2 shape as they work the ball into the penalty area. As Ibrahima Konateplays the ball forward, midfielder Ryan Gravenberchdrifts between his centre-backs with Luis Diaztucking in from the left wing…
… such that, if Liverpool do lose the ball in this sequence (which they did), they can win it back quickly by condensing the space (which they also did).
Dominant sides naturally leave space behind them as they look to suffocate the opposition, so the secondary defensive task is about ensuring you have the numbers to stifle a counter-attack whenever the opposition manages to wriggle through.
While they often struggled to do this last season, Liverpool’s recovery runs appear to be better in those transitional moments under Slot. In the opening 10 minutes against Brentford, Liverpool are retreating as Yoane Wissacarries the ball forward, but they are quick to get bodies back and regain their shape. There are seven men behind the ball by the time he releases the pass.
The same was true later in the half, with Bryan Mbeumocharging forward before Liverpool quickly shuffled back into their back-four structure with a trio of midfielders behind the ball and Luis Diaz retreating to support.
“I normally don’t use the word ‘proud’, but what we did very well in all three games is our work rate without the ball,” said Slot after the Manchester United game.
“So we try to press the opponent as high as we can, but if they play through or over our press, I see everybody working really hard to make sure we don’t need Alisson. Sometimes we do and it’s a really good thing (that) we have a really good goalkeeper.”
Against United, the gaps in Liverpool’s shape upon losing the ball (the first slide in the GIF below) were too big at times. What was promising was their decision-making as a unit, just as Slot declared: if you cannot press high, be prepared to retreat.
Within seconds of United’s foray forward, there are bodies behind the ball as the midfield regains its shape and Diaz drops in to support once again from the left wing (the third slide).
The same was true in the closing stages at Old Trafford. United broke into space but Slot’s men retreated with a back four, midfield triangle and supporting winger — this time Cody Gakpo— quickly in position.
By the time Amad Dialloplays the pass (slide three), Liverpool’s compactness was fully regained.
The final example comes from the first game of the season. As Ipswich Townregain the ball in their own third, Liverpool’s shape is decent (slide one), but they are not in a position to counter-press effectively.
Instead, they fall back into their defensive shape with a back four, midfield pivots and — you guessed it — a retreating left-winger to support. Within 10 seconds, the ball is back in Liverpool’s hands having stifled the threat of an Ipswich counter-attack.
If the opportunity is there to jump forward, take it. If the moment is not right, be prepared to recover and get men behind the ball as quickly as possible.
Sure, there might be teething problems as Liverpool continue to adapt to Slot’s demands — they have, for example, shown vulnerability in transition moments from their own attacking corners — but the early signs are encouraging.
Liverpool’s decision-making looks much improved, and they are playing more with their heads than their hearts under their new head coach.
Why Liverpool’s compact defence is Arne Slot’s first big win
By Mark Carey
When studying Arne Slot’s tactical tweaks, the discussion has centred on Liverpool’s patient build-up and careful progression through the attacking thirds.
However, it is worth noting how impressive their out-of-possession performances have been — and it has not gone unnoticed in the squad.
“We look a bit more secure defensively and had a lot more control,” Andrew Robertson told Sky Sports after their 3-0 victory over Manchester United.
“They always say clean sheets will win you things, and that’s always been the case when Manchester Cityhave won the league and when we did. Three games without a goal conceded is really good and we want to keep that going.”
Yes, we are still in the early stages and tougher challenges await. Based on Opta’s Power Rankings (a global league table of domestic sides that uses advanced analytics to assign an ‘ability score’ from 0-100), Liverpool’s opening 10 games are the sixth-easiest among the 20 teams in the Premier League.
Nevertheless, there have been promising signs that Liverpool are notably more solid when defending transitional moments. Fending off counter-attacks was often their undoing last season as they ran out of steam.
“When you look back at last season’s stats, even when we were still in the title race, we were conceding more chances than Arsenaland Man City. When you keep doing that, you will get punished. Alisson made far too many saves,” Robertson said.
“We conceded too many shots and we’ve worked hard to limit that. We’re not perfect, we’re not anywhere near where the manager wants us to be — but we’re getting there and we can see improvements day to day.”
Beyond the obvious statistics of shots and goals conceded, Jurgen Klopp’s men conceded 3.1 ‘direct attacks’ — a proxy of counter-attacking — per 90 minutes last season, the sixth-highest in the Premier League. For context, title rivals Manchester City and Arsenal were among the bottom three for that metric.
Looking at examples from last season, Liverpool’s all-action style meant there were too many occasions where the opposition got beyond the midfield line with numbers descending on a retreating defence.
We can further interrogate the numbers from last season using data from Footovision — an analytics company that has created new contextual metrics by combining event and tracking data from video broadcast footage.
As The Athletic has outlined, Liverpool were typically front-footed after losing the ball last year with their frequent counter-pressing actions. Quick regains high up the field were synonymous with former manager Klopp, but when his team were played through, they were often too open defensively.
Among all the defensive phases of the game when Liverpool were out of possession, 34 per cent of that time was spent in transition — ie, the moments when one team loses the ball and the other team gains possession.
Only Tottenham Hotspurhad a higher share of time in this phase, which speaks to the high-octane style that Klopp regained during his final season at the club.
Pouncing quickly in these transitional moments can be lucrative from an attacking sense. Tactically, they are designed to take advantage of the opponent’s unstructured shape as they look to shift into their own possession phase.
Klopp has referred to these moments as “organised chaos” from his team. It might look frantic, but it requires close coordination from all outfielders to ensure that the spaces are closed and the opposition cannot wriggle free.
For Liverpool, the numbers suggest they did not squeeze the pitch as much as they would have liked last season. Footovision’s metrics record the vertical compactness (in metres) during the moments of transition to a defensive phase. This is calculated by looking at the average vertical distance between any player and the centre-point of the team at the moment of the turnover.
Liverpool’s compactness distance of 9.9 metres was the third-highest in these moments, underpinning the gaps in their team shape from back to front.
It might not seem like a large spread of distances across the league but, at the elite level, these small distances matter — they can be the difference between making a tackle or conceding an opposition counter-attack.
Mapping out Liverpool’s defensive block compared with Manchester City and Arsenal last season, Klopp’s side had the highest width (31 metres) and depth (28 metres) in their team shape during moments of transition.
In short, there was more space for the opposition to exploit in these crucial moments — a key reason Liverpool conceded more counter-attacks than most in the division.
It is far too early to rely on this season’s numbers, but there looks to be a qualitative difference in Liverpool’s defensive output under Slot.
First, their switch to a 4-2-4 out of possession has provided a solid foundation across their general defensive phase, with wingers blocking passes out to the opposition full-backs and a striker (Diogo Jota) and attacking midfielder (Dominik Szoboszlai) preventing the ball from being progressed through central spaces.
In transitional moments, Slot has harnessed Liverpool’s energetic, front-footed approach when they do not have the ball — shown by each of their three goals coming from direct attacks following high turnovers against Manchester United.
However, Robertson’s reference to greater defensive control is partly linked to their diligence on the ball when progressing through the thirds, gradually pinning the opposition back with a robust structure that prevents the opposition from getting out if they win it back.
As you can see from their home game against Brentford, this approach is beneficial for two reasons. First, it helps to sustain attacks — as Mohamed Salahtakes possession away from Kristoffer Ajer— but with so many bodies around the ball in a compact shape, it also means there are fewer transitional moments to concede.
It is a good example of how Slot has structured Liverpool’s ‘rest defence’ — a term that looks at a team’s defensive positioning and shape when they are attacking.
Below, you can see Liverpool in a compact 3-5-2 shape as they work the ball into the penalty area. As Ibrahima Konateplays the ball forward, midfielder Ryan Gravenberchdrifts between his centre-backs with Luis Diaztucking in from the left wing…
… such that, if Liverpool do lose the ball in this sequence (which they did), they can win it back quickly by condensing the space (which they also did).
Dominant sides naturally leave space behind them as they look to suffocate the opposition, so the secondary defensive task is about ensuring you have the numbers to stifle a counter-attack whenever the opposition manages to wriggle through.
While they often struggled to do this last season, Liverpool’s recovery runs appear to be better in those transitional moments under Slot. In the opening 10 minutes against Brentford, Liverpool are retreating as Yoane Wissacarries the ball forward, but they are quick to get bodies back and regain their shape. There are seven men behind the ball by the time he releases the pass.
The same was true later in the half, with Bryan Mbeumocharging forward before Liverpool quickly shuffled back into their back-four structure with a trio of midfielders behind the ball and Luis Diaz retreating to support.
“I normally don’t use the word ‘proud’, but what we did very well in all three games is our work rate without the ball,” said Slot after the Manchester United game.
“So we try to press the opponent as high as we can, but if they play through or over our press, I see everybody working really hard to make sure we don’t need Alisson. Sometimes we do and it’s a really good thing (that) we have a really good goalkeeper.”
Against United, the gaps in Liverpool’s shape upon losing the ball (the first slide in the GIF below) were too big at times. What was promising was their decision-making as a unit, just as Slot declared: if you cannot press high, be prepared to retreat.
Within seconds of United’s foray forward, there are bodies behind the ball as the midfield regains its shape and Diaz drops in to support once again from the left wing (the third slide).
The same was true in the closing stages at Old Trafford. United broke into space but Slot’s men retreated with a back four, midfield triangle and supporting winger — this time Cody Gakpo— quickly in position.
By the time Amad Dialloplays the pass (slide three), Liverpool’s compactness was fully regained.
The final example comes from the first game of the season. As Ipswich Townregain the ball in their own third, Liverpool’s shape is decent (slide one), but they are not in a position to counter-press effectively.
Instead, they fall back into their defensive shape with a back four, midfield pivots and — you guessed it — a retreating left-winger to support. Within 10 seconds, the ball is back in Liverpool’s hands having stifled the threat of an Ipswich counter-attack.
If the opportunity is there to jump forward, take it. If the moment is not right, be prepared to recover and get men behind the ball as quickly as possible.
Sure, there might be teething problems as Liverpool continue to adapt to Slot’s demands — they have, for example, shown vulnerability in transition moments from their own attacking corners — but the early signs are encouraging.
Liverpool’s decision-making looks much improved, and they are playing more with their heads than their hearts under their new head coach.