(自留)The struggles and triumphs of Kobe Bryant's Game 7 in 2010 NBA Finals由卡哇伊爱小西瓜 发表在ClipsNation https://bbs.hupu.com/672
My recent experience of rewatching Game 7 of the 2010 NBA Finals was so much different than the first and only time I’d seen it before. It was the most stressful fan experience of my life and for years I told myself I never wanted to watch it again, even though I knew it all worked out in the end.
It’s the most storybook of all Lakers championships, with apologies to the 1984-85 team. One where Kobe Bryant fought through an awful shooting night and stood triumphantly on the scorer’s table as confetti rained down upon him. One where Pau Gasol made one clutch play after another while winning the physical battle against Kevin Garnett. One where Lamar Odom changed the game in the third quarter with his Swiss Army knife versatility. One where Ron Artest kept the Lakers in the game in the first half and hit the game’s biggest shot. One where the Lakers avenged their 2008 defeat to the hated Boston Celtics in a comeback, Game 7 victory. It may as well be a Hollywood script written by a Lakers fan.
That happy reality obscured a much darker, alternative timeline that still makes my Laker soul shudder to this day. One where the Lakers don’t come back to win. One where the Boston Celtics celebrated their 18th championship on the Lakers’ home floor. One where Kevin Garnett’s bellow of “ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE!” would echo through a rapidly emptying Staples Center as David Stern presented Paul Pierce with his second Finals MVP award. One where Kobe Bryant’s Game 7 performance was a prominent and permanent stain on his legacy. It may as well be a dystopian horror novel written by a Laker fan.
Thankfully that scenario only resides in my nightmares, but as a Kobe apologist I’ve always wondered what in the world he was doing for the first three quarters of this game. Why he shot so poorly? How much did he contribute toward the victory in other aspects of the game? This is my attempt to answer those questions.
Kobe’s shot selection in the first half of this game was absolutely atrocious. Determining what was or wasn’t a good shot for Kobe was a particularly subjective task, considering that he’s arguably the greatest “bad” shotmaker in NBA history. His incomparably polished skills and innate belief in himself produced a lengthy highlight reel of nearly impossible shots throughout his career. But they also led to a lot of bad misses that are easy and convenient to forget.
The context of the series pushed his shot selection into absurd territory by Game 7. He was white hot in the previous two games, averaging 32 points per game on a 60.3 true shooting percentage in a series where buckets were tough to come by. Many of those points came on “bad” shots.
But his distrust of Ron Artest’s 3-point shooting was just as much of a motivating factor.
The Celtics used Paul Pierce to rove on defense throughout the series, leaving Artest wide open for much of it. He shot just 31.6 percent from three through the first five games despite the high quality of those looks. A 3-for-6 performance in a blowout, Game 6 win wasn’t enough to convince Kobe that Artest would produce when it mattered most.
So for much of the first half, Kobe refused to pass him the ball.
Andrew Bynum steps up from his position in the pinch post to set a ball screen for Kobe on this play, as Wallace hedges high in case Kobe has designs on shooting the pull-up jumper. Pierce leaves Artest to fully commit to Bynum’s roll to the basket as he had all series, narrowing the Lakers’ window of opportunity on the pick-and-roll and buying Allen enough time to recover. Kobe begins to post up on Allen while Artest relocates to the top of the key to improve the passing angle. But Pierce doesn’t follow him, opting to stay in the paint to gunk up any opportunities inside.
That leaves Artest wide open, but Kobe chooses to not make the pass and spins baseline instead. Pierce double teams him as he makes that move, further abandoning Artest as he does, but Kobe still doesn’t pass him the ball. Allen, knowing that Pierce’s help is coming, overplays Kobe toward the baseline. As this is happening, Artest has relocated even more and is now alone on the wing. The play ends with Kobe shooting a turnaround jumper in the direction that Allen is overplaying him in, and the ball comically clanks off the side of the backboard.
Artest wasn’t the only victim of Kobe’s do-it-himself mentality, but he was the most frequent. I counted six possessions in the first half alone that were similar to the play above, where Artest was wide open, but Kobe chose to attack instead. In total, Kobe shot 1 for 10 on shots where I believe he made the incorrect shot/pass/drive decision, comprising an astonishingly high percentage of his 24 attempts overall.
But that still means he shot just 5 for 14 on the quality looks he got in Game 7.
His pull-up jumper was the primary culprit, particularly when he was going to his left. Players and coaches generally consider long or short misses on jumpers to be acceptable, but shots that miss to the left or right are more concerning and indicative of technical issues. Kobe’s balance on his jumper was usually impeccable, but it was out of sync in Game 7, resulting in eight left/right misses.
Kobe holds the ball behind his head after catching the entry pass from Artest on this play, as Ray Allen ball pressures him. He then uses a quick jab step to sell a drive to his right. Allen had been biting on this move all series — he had to, or else Kobe would blow by him — and this play is no exception. After a hard dribble to his left, Kobe has created an open look with his feet underneath him. He was usually money on these shots. But watch where his feet are planted as he goes up and compare that to how they land. His feet are shoulder-width apart, and his upper-body is square to the basket as he raises up, but his right foot is in front of his left and his upper body is square with the sideline when he lands. This is evidence of him twisting his hips counter-clockwise, and it’s no coincidence that this attempt misses to the left.
To my eye, Kobe looked sped up on the majority of his pull-up jumpers, and within his overall game as well. This hip twist was one of several uncharacteristic fundamental mistakes he was making, rather than a repeated error that plagued all of his jumpers. The faster a player attempts to execute a move, the more imprecise they will be, and that led to many of his uncharacteristic misses. Two of his three makes on these shots came on break-rhythm attempts that forced him to slow down for a moment. Kobe was amped up for regular season games against lottery teams, so it isn’t a stretch to believe that perhaps he was a little too excited for this game, considering the stakes. That would explain his shot selection to some degree as well.
Despite his awful shooting, he still provided significant value by simply being Kobe Bryant. He commanded the attention of multiple defenders, and Boston sent a variety of double teams at him throughout the series. Those varied from hard doubles in the post and on pick-and-roll blitzes, to softer doubles that were meant to contain him, but gave defenders time to recover to their man. Kobe did well to exploit this additional attention in Game 7, so long as it didn’t require him to pass to Artest.
Kobe advances the ball past half court on this play as Pau Gasol trails and sets a drag screen. Boston’s defensive scheme — led by assistant coach Tom Thibodeau — dictates that they “ice” this screen and not allow Kobe to use it, sending him baseline instead. Allen positions his body to do just that, while Kevin Garnett is tasked with containing Kobe should he choose to drive to the basket. This would be Boston’s coverage against anyone on a side pick-and-roll, but the threat of Kobe’s pull-up jumper meant that Garnett had to hedge higher than usual.
Kobe’s responsibility in this moment is to “dribble drag,” meaning that he should dribble toward the baseline, pulling both Allen and Garnett with him, and away from Pau. But Kobe notices that Rajon Rondo is cheating hard off of Derek Fisher and toward Pau. Rondo has to do this because Garnett’s higher hedge makes the Celtics’ defense more vulnerable to Pau rolling to the basket, because Garnett wouldn’t be able to recover in time to stop that. Kobe makes a skip pass to Fisher as a result of Rondo’s extra help. Rondo scrambles back to Fisher as Paul Pierce attempts to jump the passing lane to Artest, leaving Fisher with a clean post entry pass to Bynum, who’s established a deep seal on Rasheed Wallace.
The Lakers shot relatively poorly on open shots where Kobe drew two defenders, but it comprised some of the best looks that the Lakers got in a game where both teams struggled to beat defenses that knew them inside and out. He was something that the Celtics didn’t have, an on-ball threat who demanded secondary attention in a way that compromised the defense.
Kobe’s value in this game extended beyond his shot creation, but only to a degree on the defensive end. He was strong in this aspect of the game, but more part of a stellar team effort than a standout performer. He sagged off of Rondo as he had all series and disrupted passing lanes as he did, and stayed attached to Ray Allen when he was asked to chase him around screens. But he also had a couple of slow rotations as a pick-and-roll help defender and many other plays where he simply wasn’t involved in the outcome of the possession.
His defensive rebounding, however, was essential to the win.
Rondo surprises Kobe on this play by attacking out of a quick drag screen with Garnett. That causes Kobe to make the mistake of going over the screen — he’s supposed to go under against Rondo — and this leads to a dangerous moment for the Lakers. Pau has to step up to contest Rondo’s floater, and since Kobe’s gone over the screen, that means that Garnett momentarily has inside position for the rebound. Kobe knows this, and scrambles to get back in front of Garnett, which he does. Meanwhile, Odom has made the mistake of leaving his man to also help on Rondo, so Glen Davis dives to the basket to take advantage of a potential putback opportunity.
The basketball gods bless the Lakers with a carom in Kobe’s direction instead of Davis’, who sends Kobe to the free throw line after crashing into him. Kobe’s incredible stamina and conditioning allowed him to provide constant effort while dropping down from the perimeter to help the Lakers secure crucial possessions down the stretch.
But no matter the degree of his subtle contributions, his primary job was to help the Lakers put points on the board. He and Phil Jackson finally found a way to do that in the fourth quarter by isolating him on Ray Allen.
Kobe drew first blood by drawing three free throws on a rip through move, catching Allen reaching in. Three minutes later, he finally hit the pull-up jumper that had eluded him for most of the game, catching Allen off balance with a rip through move. It was his final made field goal of the game. He blew by Allen two minutes later with the same rip through, drawing two of his nine free throw attempts in the quarter after he was fouled on a dunk attempt.
Boston then began to double Kobe even on his isolation possessions, just as they had throughout the series once he began to do damage.
He holds the ball in triple threat position on the left wing with 10 seconds left on the shot clock on this play. Rasheed Wallace leaves Odom to double Kobe, giving Pierce the responsibility of “zoning up” on the weak side, meaning that he’s tasked with defending both Odom and Artest. Kobe dribbles away from Wallace’s double team and jumps in the air to improve his passing angle, knowing that someone has to be open on the weak side. As Kobe gets to the peak of his jump, it’s apparent that he’d much rather make this pass to Odom, but Pierce is in that passing lane, and Kobe has no other choice. Artest receives the pass on the right wing, gives Pierce a quick jab step, and the rest is history.
Kobe had finally passed Artest the ball.
Artest was huge in Game 7, keeping the Lakers in the game with a 12-point outburst in the second quarter, where he played more like a big man than a perimeter player. He provided physical man defense on Pierce too, just as he had for most of the series. He never pouted or showed outward frustration when Kobe looked him off, even when it would have been justified. And he was ready when his number was finally called. He even graced Laker fans with the greatest post-game press conference in Lakers’ history once his work was done.
Game 7 of the 2010 NBA Finals was not the pinnacle of Kobe’s basketball abilities, but rather a fractal of his career. He began it as a confident but shameless chucker who ignored open teammates while badly missing jumpers in the biggest game of his life, just as he had as a playoff rookie in Utah. But he grew wiser as time went on, greeting failure as an opportunity to explore alternative paths to victory and getting critical help from teammates along the way. It was the Kobe-ist of games by measure of will, if not skill. Stubborn and often misguided, but indomitable, unforgettable, and ultimately triumphant.
And that’s why it’s my favorite Kobe game of all time.
My recent experience of rewatching Game 7 of the 2010 NBA Finals was so much different than the first and only time I’d seen it before. It was the most stressful fan experience of my life and for years I told myself I never wanted to watch it again, even though I knew it all worked out in the end.
It’s the most storybook of all Lakers championships, with apologies to the 1984-85 team. One where Kobe Bryant fought through an awful shooting night and stood triumphantly on the scorer’s table as confetti rained down upon him. One where Pau Gasol made one clutch play after another while winning the physical battle against Kevin Garnett. One where Lamar Odom changed the game in the third quarter with his Swiss Army knife versatility. One where Ron Artest kept the Lakers in the game in the first half and hit the game’s biggest shot. One where the Lakers avenged their 2008 defeat to the hated Boston Celtics in a comeback, Game 7 victory. It may as well be a Hollywood script written by a Lakers fan.
That happy reality obscured a much darker, alternative timeline that still makes my Laker soul shudder to this day. One where the Lakers don’t come back to win. One where the Boston Celtics celebrated their 18th championship on the Lakers’ home floor. One where Kevin Garnett’s bellow of “ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE!” would echo through a rapidly emptying Staples Center as David Stern presented Paul Pierce with his second Finals MVP award. One where Kobe Bryant’s Game 7 performance was a prominent and permanent stain on his legacy. It may as well be a dystopian horror novel written by a Laker fan.
Thankfully that scenario only resides in my nightmares, but as a Kobe apologist I’ve always wondered what in the world he was doing for the first three quarters of this game. Why he shot so poorly? How much did he contribute toward the victory in other aspects of the game? This is my attempt to answer those questions.
Kobe’s shot selection in the first half of this game was absolutely atrocious. Determining what was or wasn’t a good shot for Kobe was a particularly subjective task, considering that he’s arguably the greatest “bad” shotmaker in NBA history. His incomparably polished skills and innate belief in himself produced a lengthy highlight reel of nearly impossible shots throughout his career. But they also led to a lot of bad misses that are easy and convenient to forget.
The context of the series pushed his shot selection into absurd territory by Game 7. He was white hot in the previous two games, averaging 32 points per game on a 60.3 true shooting percentage in a series where buckets were tough to come by. Many of those points came on “bad” shots.
But his distrust of Ron Artest’s 3-point shooting was just as much of a motivating factor.
The Celtics used Paul Pierce to rove on defense throughout the series, leaving Artest wide open for much of it. He shot just 31.6 percent from three through the first five games despite the high quality of those looks. A 3-for-6 performance in a blowout, Game 6 win wasn’t enough to convince Kobe that Artest would produce when it mattered most.
So for much of the first half, Kobe refused to pass him the ball.
Andrew Bynum steps up from his position in the pinch post to set a ball screen for Kobe on this play, as Wallace hedges high in case Kobe has designs on shooting the pull-up jumper. Pierce leaves Artest to fully commit to Bynum’s roll to the basket as he had all series, narrowing the Lakers’ window of opportunity on the pick-and-roll and buying Allen enough time to recover. Kobe begins to post up on Allen while Artest relocates to the top of the key to improve the passing angle. But Pierce doesn’t follow him, opting to stay in the paint to gunk up any opportunities inside.
That leaves Artest wide open, but Kobe chooses to not make the pass and spins baseline instead. Pierce double teams him as he makes that move, further abandoning Artest as he does, but Kobe still doesn’t pass him the ball. Allen, knowing that Pierce’s help is coming, overplays Kobe toward the baseline. As this is happening, Artest has relocated even more and is now alone on the wing. The play ends with Kobe shooting a turnaround jumper in the direction that Allen is overplaying him in, and the ball comically clanks off the side of the backboard.
Artest wasn’t the only victim of Kobe’s do-it-himself mentality, but he was the most frequent. I counted six possessions in the first half alone that were similar to the play above, where Artest was wide open, but Kobe chose to attack instead. In total, Kobe shot 1 for 10 on shots where I believe he made the incorrect shot/pass/drive decision, comprising an astonishingly high percentage of his 24 attempts overall.
But that still means he shot just 5 for 14 on the quality looks he got in Game 7.
His pull-up jumper was the primary culprit, particularly when he was going to his left. Players and coaches generally consider long or short misses on jumpers to be acceptable, but shots that miss to the left or right are more concerning and indicative of technical issues. Kobe’s balance on his jumper was usually impeccable, but it was out of sync in Game 7, resulting in eight left/right misses.
Kobe holds the ball behind his head after catching the entry pass from Artest on this play, as Ray Allen ball pressures him. He then uses a quick jab step to sell a drive to his right. Allen had been biting on this move all series — he had to, or else Kobe would blow by him — and this play is no exception. After a hard dribble to his left, Kobe has created an open look with his feet underneath him. He was usually money on these shots. But watch where his feet are planted as he goes up and compare that to how they land. His feet are shoulder-width apart, and his upper-body is square to the basket as he raises up, but his right foot is in front of his left and his upper body is square with the sideline when he lands. This is evidence of him twisting his hips counter-clockwise, and it’s no coincidence that this attempt misses to the left.
To my eye, Kobe looked sped up on the majority of his pull-up jumpers, and within his overall game as well. This hip twist was one of several uncharacteristic fundamental mistakes he was making, rather than a repeated error that plagued all of his jumpers. The faster a player attempts to execute a move, the more imprecise they will be, and that led to many of his uncharacteristic misses. Two of his three makes on these shots came on break-rhythm attempts that forced him to slow down for a moment. Kobe was amped up for regular season games against lottery teams, so it isn’t a stretch to believe that perhaps he was a little too excited for this game, considering the stakes. That would explain his shot selection to some degree as well.
Despite his awful shooting, he still provided significant value by simply being Kobe Bryant. He commanded the attention of multiple defenders, and Boston sent a variety of double teams at him throughout the series. Those varied from hard doubles in the post and on pick-and-roll blitzes, to softer doubles that were meant to contain him, but gave defenders time to recover to their man. Kobe did well to exploit this additional attention in Game 7, so long as it didn’t require him to pass to Artest.
Kobe advances the ball past half court on this play as Pau Gasol trails and sets a drag screen. Boston’s defensive scheme — led by assistant coach Tom Thibodeau — dictates that they “ice” this screen and not allow Kobe to use it, sending him baseline instead. Allen positions his body to do just that, while Kevin Garnett is tasked with containing Kobe should he choose to drive to the basket. This would be Boston’s coverage against anyone on a side pick-and-roll, but the threat of Kobe’s pull-up jumper meant that Garnett had to hedge higher than usual.
Kobe’s responsibility in this moment is to “dribble drag,” meaning that he should dribble toward the baseline, pulling both Allen and Garnett with him, and away from Pau. But Kobe notices that Rajon Rondo is cheating hard off of Derek Fisher and toward Pau. Rondo has to do this because Garnett’s higher hedge makes the Celtics’ defense more vulnerable to Pau rolling to the basket, because Garnett wouldn’t be able to recover in time to stop that. Kobe makes a skip pass to Fisher as a result of Rondo’s extra help. Rondo scrambles back to Fisher as Paul Pierce attempts to jump the passing lane to Artest, leaving Fisher with a clean post entry pass to Bynum, who’s established a deep seal on Rasheed Wallace.
The Lakers shot relatively poorly on open shots where Kobe drew two defenders, but it comprised some of the best looks that the Lakers got in a game where both teams struggled to beat defenses that knew them inside and out. He was something that the Celtics didn’t have, an on-ball threat who demanded secondary attention in a way that compromised the defense.
Kobe’s value in this game extended beyond his shot creation, but only to a degree on the defensive end. He was strong in this aspect of the game, but more part of a stellar team effort than a standout performer. He sagged off of Rondo as he had all series and disrupted passing lanes as he did, and stayed attached to Ray Allen when he was asked to chase him around screens. But he also had a couple of slow rotations as a pick-and-roll help defender and many other plays where he simply wasn’t involved in the outcome of the possession.
His defensive rebounding, however, was essential to the win.
Rondo surprises Kobe on this play by attacking out of a quick drag screen with Garnett. That causes Kobe to make the mistake of going over the screen — he’s supposed to go under against Rondo — and this leads to a dangerous moment for the Lakers. Pau has to step up to contest Rondo’s floater, and since Kobe’s gone over the screen, that means that Garnett momentarily has inside position for the rebound. Kobe knows this, and scrambles to get back in front of Garnett, which he does. Meanwhile, Odom has made the mistake of leaving his man to also help on Rondo, so Glen Davis dives to the basket to take advantage of a potential putback opportunity.
The basketball gods bless the Lakers with a carom in Kobe’s direction instead of Davis’, who sends Kobe to the free throw line after crashing into him. Kobe’s incredible stamina and conditioning allowed him to provide constant effort while dropping down from the perimeter to help the Lakers secure crucial possessions down the stretch.
But no matter the degree of his subtle contributions, his primary job was to help the Lakers put points on the board. He and Phil Jackson finally found a way to do that in the fourth quarter by isolating him on Ray Allen.
Kobe drew first blood by drawing three free throws on a rip through move, catching Allen reaching in. Three minutes later, he finally hit the pull-up jumper that had eluded him for most of the game, catching Allen off balance with a rip through move. It was his final made field goal of the game. He blew by Allen two minutes later with the same rip through, drawing two of his nine free throw attempts in the quarter after he was fouled on a dunk attempt.
Boston then began to double Kobe even on his isolation possessions, just as they had throughout the series once he began to do damage.
He holds the ball in triple threat position on the left wing with 10 seconds left on the shot clock on this play. Rasheed Wallace leaves Odom to double Kobe, giving Pierce the responsibility of “zoning up” on the weak side, meaning that he’s tasked with defending both Odom and Artest. Kobe dribbles away from Wallace’s double team and jumps in the air to improve his passing angle, knowing that someone has to be open on the weak side. As Kobe gets to the peak of his jump, it’s apparent that he’d much rather make this pass to Odom, but Pierce is in that passing lane, and Kobe has no other choice. Artest receives the pass on the right wing, gives Pierce a quick jab step, and the rest is history.
Kobe had finally passed Artest the ball.
Artest was huge in Game 7, keeping the Lakers in the game with a 12-point outburst in the second quarter, where he played more like a big man than a perimeter player. He provided physical man defense on Pierce too, just as he had for most of the series. He never pouted or showed outward frustration when Kobe looked him off, even when it would have been justified. And he was ready when his number was finally called. He even graced Laker fans with the greatest post-game press conference in Lakers’ history once his work was done.
Game 7 of the 2010 NBA Finals was not the pinnacle of Kobe’s basketball abilities, but rather a fractal of his career. He began it as a confident but shameless chucker who ignored open teammates while badly missing jumpers in the biggest game of his life, just as he had as a playoff rookie in Utah. But he grew wiser as time went on, greeting failure as an opportunity to explore alternative paths to victory and getting critical help from teammates along the way. It was the Kobe-ist of games by measure of will, if not skill. Stubborn and often misguided, but indomitable, unforgettable, and ultimately triumphant.
And that’s why it’s my favorite Kobe game of all time.
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