The Analytical Lookaround: The Celtics’ difficult defensive conundrum由那么爱呢_ 发表在翻译团招工部 https://bbs.hupu.com/fyt-store
Throughout the course of the NBA Playoffs, The Athletic’s NBA Data Analyst, Seth Partnow, will provide his expertise to analyze the things that stand out most to him from the previous day’s slate. You can find his Analytical Lookarounds here.
Miami 37, Boston 17.
That was the scoring margin in the pivotal third quarter as Miami took a 2-0 lead in the Eastern Conference Finals. From Boston’s standpoint, it is up for debate whether the 37 or the 17 is the more concerning side of that equation — and they are, of course, related — but I want to focus on the defensive side, as the choices Boston has made and is now being forced to reevaluate about how to guard the Heat are illustrative of the strategic complexity that can make the game-to-game progression of a playoff series so fascinating to watch unfold.
Much of the damage was done by Bam Adebayo, who put up 15 in the quarter on 7-for-8 shooting, but given that all seven makes were assisted and six were dunks or layups, the focus needs to be on how he got free for so many high-value attempts. All seven were set up by dribble penetration or at least the threat thereof, while five of the makes came directly out of pick-and-roll or pick-and-roll-like dribble handoff actions. Of those five, Kemba Walker was defending the ballhandler on four of them.
Zooming back out, Goran Dragic has been the driving force for the Miami offense across the first two games. NBA.com matchup data estimates the following players have spent significant time guarding him either as primary defenders or on switches during Dragic’s offensive floor time:
Who’s Defending Dragic?
PLAYER PERCENTAGE
This isn’t to pick on Walker, but as a smaller guard he (and Wanamaker) has struggled to contain Dragic and other Heat ballhandlers largely because of all the preparatory action Miami runs to create space for Dragic prior to the pick even being set. For example, consider the first play of the second half:
Defending a Dragic/Duncan Robinson exchange leaves Walker trailing the play before Dragic even gets the ball. Meaning Walker’s trailing the play, giving the Heat a 5-4 with Bam rolling to the hoop and three shooters perfectly spaced. In other words, the Celtics are screwed.
Walker works hard, but because of his small frame this is the sort of thing that happens to him: he doesn’t have the body strength to either get through screens or bump the cutter/ballhandler offline enough to give himself space to get over. Other players on the Celtics do have the physicality to navigate in those spaces, notably Jaylen Brown. As noted above, Brown has spent the least amount of time guarding Dragic of any relevant Celtic, with even Theis forced onto Dragic more frequently.
While it can be hard to discern individual defensive ability from situational “points allowed” stats, it is worth noting that according to Second Spectrum data obtained from a league source, opponents have been somewhat less efficient when the ballhandler has been defended by Brown (0.90 points per chance when a scoring opportunity comes directly from a ballscreen) than Walker (0.93 points per chance). Walker defended about three more such chances per game as Brown’s size and athleticism makes him something of a Swiss Army Knife of a defender. In this series, Brown has instead been deployed as the most frequent designated chaser of Robinson, matched up for just over 30 percent of Robinson’s time on offense.
I’ve said it before, Robinson’s ability to shoot a high percentage despite being on the move and under heavy duress makes him a capital-W Weapon. But as I wrote prior to the postseason when discussing some of the difficulties Miami might present Milwaukee: “This is not a situation where a team can gear its coverages to Robinson without danger lurking elsewhere, as the attention needed to not just contest but deter Robinson from shooting entirely almost can’t help but open gaps for the other threats to play off the main weapon.”
And it’s not like switching the matchup and putting Walker on Robinson is a panacea. The same issues that plague Walker getting through ballscreens crop up defending off ball actions as well. And even if he does manage to stay close to Robinson, his stature is probably less of a deterrent than would be the much larger Brown:
That brings us to Boston’s tough decision. As the playoffs progress, both teams tend to be very good and present the opposition with multiple unpalatable options. Walker doesn’t have a good parking spot for a team with as movement-laden an offense as Miami’s. But he’s too importantly offensively to bench, so what’s the least worst option?
At this point, I would argue it’s Robinson, based on sheer volume. Robinson is perhaps the most dangerous catch-and-shoot player in the league, but one-dribble pullups aside that’s about all he is offensively. As such, there is a hard ceiling on how much damage he can do. In only one postseason game thus far has Robinson posted a single-game usage rate of at least 20 percent, and that was exactly 20 percent. In 73 regular-season appearances, he did so 16 times, zero of which saw him both play more than 20 minutes and use more than 23 percent of Miami’s offensive chances while on the floor. By comparison, Dragic’s usage rate for the series is above 27 percent, and toss in another nearly 12 percent for his playmaking (of which Robinson does very little considering how little he handles the ball) and Dragic is directly involved in nearly 40 percent of Miami’s offense.
An additional point in favor of putting Brown in matchups more directly involved in the action at the expense of Walker is rebounding. Tracking data over the years has demonstrated that the closer a player starts to the rim when the ball is shot, the more likely he is to end up with the board. No shock there, but if Brown is chasing Robinson 25 feet from the basket, he’s not going to be available to rebound. After pulling in 16.0 percent of available defensive rebounds in Boston’s first two series, he’s down to 5.0 percent through two games in the Eastern Conference Finals. Especially in Game 2, defensive rebounding, or lack thereof, has really hurt the Celtics.
Of course, there are a multitude of other factors to consider, which is part of what makes these kinds of decisions so fraught. But getting these decisions right can be the difference between winning and losing in what has been a very closely contested series to this point.
Throughout the course of the NBA Playoffs, The Athletic’s NBA Data Analyst, Seth Partnow, will provide his expertise to analyze the things that stand out most to him from the previous day’s slate. You can find his Analytical Lookarounds here.
Miami 37, Boston 17.
That was the scoring margin in the pivotal third quarter as Miami took a 2-0 lead in the Eastern Conference Finals. From Boston’s standpoint, it is up for debate whether the 37 or the 17 is the more concerning side of that equation — and they are, of course, related — but I want to focus on the defensive side, as the choices Boston has made and is now being forced to reevaluate about how to guard the Heat are illustrative of the strategic complexity that can make the game-to-game progression of a playoff series so fascinating to watch unfold.
Much of the damage was done by Bam Adebayo, who put up 15 in the quarter on 7-for-8 shooting, but given that all seven makes were assisted and six were dunks or layups, the focus needs to be on how he got free for so many high-value attempts. All seven were set up by dribble penetration or at least the threat thereof, while five of the makes came directly out of pick-and-roll or pick-and-roll-like dribble handoff actions. Of those five, Kemba Walker was defending the ballhandler on four of them.
Zooming back out, Goran Dragic has been the driving force for the Miami offense across the first two games. NBA.com matchup data estimates the following players have spent significant time guarding him either as primary defenders or on switches during Dragic’s offensive floor time:
Who’s Defending Dragic?
PLAYER PERCENTAGE
This isn’t to pick on Walker, but as a smaller guard he (and Wanamaker) has struggled to contain Dragic and other Heat ballhandlers largely because of all the preparatory action Miami runs to create space for Dragic prior to the pick even being set. For example, consider the first play of the second half:
Defending a Dragic/Duncan Robinson exchange leaves Walker trailing the play before Dragic even gets the ball. Meaning Walker’s trailing the play, giving the Heat a 5-4 with Bam rolling to the hoop and three shooters perfectly spaced. In other words, the Celtics are screwed.
Walker works hard, but because of his small frame this is the sort of thing that happens to him: he doesn’t have the body strength to either get through screens or bump the cutter/ballhandler offline enough to give himself space to get over. Other players on the Celtics do have the physicality to navigate in those spaces, notably Jaylen Brown. As noted above, Brown has spent the least amount of time guarding Dragic of any relevant Celtic, with even Theis forced onto Dragic more frequently.
While it can be hard to discern individual defensive ability from situational “points allowed” stats, it is worth noting that according to Second Spectrum data obtained from a league source, opponents have been somewhat less efficient when the ballhandler has been defended by Brown (0.90 points per chance when a scoring opportunity comes directly from a ballscreen) than Walker (0.93 points per chance). Walker defended about three more such chances per game as Brown’s size and athleticism makes him something of a Swiss Army Knife of a defender. In this series, Brown has instead been deployed as the most frequent designated chaser of Robinson, matched up for just over 30 percent of Robinson’s time on offense.
I’ve said it before, Robinson’s ability to shoot a high percentage despite being on the move and under heavy duress makes him a capital-W Weapon. But as I wrote prior to the postseason when discussing some of the difficulties Miami might present Milwaukee: “This is not a situation where a team can gear its coverages to Robinson without danger lurking elsewhere, as the attention needed to not just contest but deter Robinson from shooting entirely almost can’t help but open gaps for the other threats to play off the main weapon.”
And it’s not like switching the matchup and putting Walker on Robinson is a panacea. The same issues that plague Walker getting through ballscreens crop up defending off ball actions as well. And even if he does manage to stay close to Robinson, his stature is probably less of a deterrent than would be the much larger Brown:
That brings us to Boston’s tough decision. As the playoffs progress, both teams tend to be very good and present the opposition with multiple unpalatable options. Walker doesn’t have a good parking spot for a team with as movement-laden an offense as Miami’s. But he’s too importantly offensively to bench, so what’s the least worst option?
At this point, I would argue it’s Robinson, based on sheer volume. Robinson is perhaps the most dangerous catch-and-shoot player in the league, but one-dribble pullups aside that’s about all he is offensively. As such, there is a hard ceiling on how much damage he can do. In only one postseason game thus far has Robinson posted a single-game usage rate of at least 20 percent, and that was exactly 20 percent. In 73 regular-season appearances, he did so 16 times, zero of which saw him both play more than 20 minutes and use more than 23 percent of Miami’s offensive chances while on the floor. By comparison, Dragic’s usage rate for the series is above 27 percent, and toss in another nearly 12 percent for his playmaking (of which Robinson does very little considering how little he handles the ball) and Dragic is directly involved in nearly 40 percent of Miami’s offense.
An additional point in favor of putting Brown in matchups more directly involved in the action at the expense of Walker is rebounding. Tracking data over the years has demonstrated that the closer a player starts to the rim when the ball is shot, the more likely he is to end up with the board. No shock there, but if Brown is chasing Robinson 25 feet from the basket, he’s not going to be available to rebound. After pulling in 16.0 percent of available defensive rebounds in Boston’s first two series, he’s down to 5.0 percent through two games in the Eastern Conference Finals. Especially in Game 2, defensive rebounding, or lack thereof, has really hurt the Celtics.
Of course, there are a multitude of other factors to consider, which is part of what makes these kinds of decisions so fraught. But getting these decisions right can be the difference between winning and losing in what has been a very closely contested series to this point.
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